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This paper presents a new computational theory of how 
humans integrate successive views to form a perceptual map.  
Traditionally, this problem has been thought of as a 
straightforward integration problem whereby position of 
objects in one view is transformed to the next and combined. 
However, this step creates a paradoxical situation in human 
perceptual mapping. On the one hand, the method requires 
errors to be corrected and the map to be constantly updated, 
and yet, on the other hand, human perception and memory 
show a high tolerance for errors and little integration of 
successive views. A new theory is presented which argues 
that our perceptual map is computed by combining views only 
at their limiting points. To do so, one must be able to 
recognize and track familiar objects across views. The theory 
has been tested successfully on mobile robots and the lessons 
learned are discussed. 
Keywords: perceptual map; cognitive map; spatial layout; 
spatial cognition. 
Introduction 
How do humans integrate successive views to form a 
perceptual map? The latter is a representation of the spatial 
layout of surfaces/objects perceived in one’s immediate 
surroundings. That we have such a map is evident in that we 
do not immediately forget what is out of sight when we turn 
or move forward (see Glennerster, Hansard & Fitzgibbon 
(p.205, 2009) for a similar argument). However, researchers 
studying this problem from four different perspectives, 
namely how we represent our environmental knowledge 
(i.e. a cognitive map (Tolman, 1948; O’Keefe & Nadel, 
1978)), what frame of references we use, how we see our 
world, and how robots create a map of their own world, 
have offered solutions which when taken together create a 
paradoxical situation. It is noted that because the problem 
lends itself to a straightforward mathematical solution 
whereby information in one view is transformed to their 
respective positions in the next view, much of the current 
studies implicitly or explicitly assume that a solution to this 
problem would involve such a step. This step is problematic 
when used to explain how humans integrate their views and 
the lack of an alternative method has hampered progress. 
In this paper, a new computational theory of human 
perceptual mapping is presented. It abandons the idea of 
integrating successive views to form a perceptual map. 
Instead, it argues that what is afforded in a view is an 
adequate description of the current spatial local environment 
and hence it does not need to be updated until one moves 
out of it. Only then, another view is added to the map. As a 
result, the map is composed of views selected at different 
times during one’s exploration of the environment. 
However, these views need to be organized into a coherent 
global map and a method has been suggested. It requires 
recognizing objects found in the selected views in all the in-
between views that have not been selected. These objects 
allow one to triangulate one’s position in the map and add 
new views to the map in their appropriate position. The 
theory has been tested successfully with different 
implementations on mobile robots and the resulting maps 
produced were found to exhibit several interesting 
characteristics of a human perceptual map.  
A Perceptual Paradox? 
Researchers who investigated how spatial memories are 
organised often suggest the existence of a two-system 
model: an egocentric model and an allocentric model (Mou, 
McNamara, Valiquette & Rump, 2004; Burgess, 2006; 
Rump & McNamara, 2007). These two models are very 
different implementations of the same basic mathematical 
model described above and therefore have different costs 
associated with their use. In particular, the former keeps 
track of the relationship between the self and all objects 
perceived. As one moves, one needs to constantly update all 
objects position in memory with respect to the viewer’s new 
position. The latter creates a global map of all objects 
perceived using a frame of reference independent of the 
viewer’s position. These researchers claimed that the former 
is best suited for organising information in a perceptual map 
while the latter is best for a cognitive map. However, little is 
said about how information encoded in an egocentric 
perceptual map is transferred into an allocentric cognitive 
map. If this is achieved via switching frame of reference, 
then the process is straightforward and from a mathematical 
standpoint, the two representations are considered 
equivalent. In this case, a perceptual map is a subset of a 
cognitive map and holds only the most recently perceived 
information. 
Researchers who investigated the nature of cognitive 
maps from studying resident’s memory of their environment 
(both adults and children) often emphasized that the map is 
fragmented, incomplete and imprecise (e.g. Lynch, 1960; 
Downs & Stea, 1973, Evans, 1980). This does not mean that 
the map is devoid of metric information but rather, one’s 
memory of such information is often found to be distorted 
systematically as a result of applying cognitive organizing 
principles (Tversky, 1992). Some well-known examples of 
these distortions include the regularization of turns and 
angles (Byrne, 1979), and over- and under- estimation of 
distances due to factors such as direction of travel (Lee, 
1970), presence of barriers (Cohen & Weatherford, 1981), 
and others. More recent studies have also shown that metric 
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knowledge could be learned very early in one’s exposure to 
a new environment (Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; Buchner & 
Jansen-Osmann, 2008). In Ishikawa and Montello’s (2006) 
study, they also found large individual differences. Most 
participants either manifested accurate metric knowledge 
from the first session or they didn’t, and knowledge of both 
groups did not show much improvement in some subsequent 
trials. Note that by accurate, it is meant that participants 
could “estimate directions and distances, and draw sketch 
maps more accurately after first exposure to the routes than 
would be expected by pure chance alone” (p. 118). All these 
observations on the nature of cognitive maps suggest that 
one’s perceptual map should also be fragmented, incomplete 






Figure 1. A distorted map 
 
Yet, robotics researchers (e.g Thrun, 2008) who have 
been developing mapping algorithms using the 
transformation approach have shown that the map produced 
must be as accurate as possible. Errors found in robot sensor 
readings are known to seriously affect the map created. 
Figure 1 shows a typically distorted map computed by a 
mobile robot equipped with a laser sensor and without using 
any error correction procedure. The robot’s path is as shown 
in Figure 2 and a rectangular shaped map should have been 
produced instead of the triangular one shown in Figure 1. 
With the map computed, one would have difficulties 
orienting oneself and there is also a danger that one could 
easily mistaken that one is returning to a familiar part of the 
environment. For example, at point C, the robot should be at 
point B in the physical space and the robot could thus be 
mistaken that it is re-entering a familiar part of the 
environment.  Robotics research thus tells us that errors 
cannot be left unchecked when using such a procedure to 
compute a map. In short, the map computed needs to be 
precise. With hindsight, this is not surprising since the 
mathematical process used is aimed at producing an 
accurate map. 
 
Figure 2. The test environment and the robot’s path  
 
If the perceptual map is necessary to be precise, it is 
surprising that our perceptual system has not evolved to 
support such computations. Take vision, for example. Our 
visual perception of the world is highly illusory (Hurlbert, 
1994; Snowden, 1999) and thus, unlike computer vision, 
what we get is not a true geometrical description of what is 
out there (Fermuller, Cheong & Aloimonos, 1997; 
Bridgeman & Hoover, 2008; Glennerster, Hansard & 
Fitzgibbon, 2009). We have high visual acuity only in the 
small foveal region of the retina and thus a large part of our 
input lacks clarity and detail. Our eyes need to make rapid 
movements (known as saccades) to bring different regions 
into the foveal. Experiments on whether humans integrate 
successive views at the saccade level reveal that we fail to 
notice many kinds of changes occurring between saccades. 
This phenomenon is known as “change blindness”  (see 
reviews of such work in Irwin, 1996; Intraub, 1997; Irwin & 
Zelinsky, 2002; Simos & Rensink, 2005) and it argues 
against the idea that successive views are integrated to form 
a single unified representation.  
The above studies, when taken together, raise serious 
doubts as to the appropriateness of a transformational 
approach to human perceptual mapping. 
A Theory of Human Perceptual Mapping 
Logically, a perceptual map is a representation of the 
environment, as it is perceived. Thus, its input is a sequence 
of views, each being an integrated representation of 
information delivered by all its sensors. For simplicity, one 
could consider information from a single sensor and 
especially if it is the most important sensor. For humans, 
this is vision. With vision, Yeap (1998) argued that the input 
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should be at the level of Marr’s (1982) 2½D sketch - a 
representation describing the shape and disposition of 
surfaces relative to the viewer. Yeap and Jefferies (1999) 
further argued that one should made explicit representations 
of local environments in a perceptual map and that these 
representations are computed from integrating successive 
views. The latter idea is again reminiscent of what was 
discussed earlier and must now be discarded. 
If a representation of one’s local environment is not 
computed from integrating successive views, what could be 
the alternative? In finding an answer, we make two 
observations. First, observe that a view affords us more than 
a description of the surfaces in front of us. It tells us what 
and where things are, where we can move to next, what 
events are unfolding, where there might be dangers, and 
others (Gibson, 1950). In short, a view is in fact a 
significant representation of a local environment and it 
should be made explicit in the map as a description of a 
local environment rather than as some spatially organised 
surfaces. Second, observe that the world we live in is 
relatively stable. That is, it does not change much when we 
blink our eyes or take a few steps forward. As such, there is 
no immediate need to update the view in our perceptual map 
as we move. For example, consider your first view of a 
corridor when entering it and assume an exit can be seen at 
the other end. If you walk down this corridor to the exit, 
then the description of the corridor space afforded in the 
first view adequately describes the local environment you 
are going through. Updating this description to include, for 
example, a view of a room besides the corridor as you walk 
past it will enrich the description, but is unnecessary if the 
room is not entered.  
The tricky part of the problem is: if one does not 
constantly update the view in the map as one moves, how 
does one know where one is in the map or that one is still in 
the current local environment? Also, when does one begin 
to update the map and how? One possible solution is to keep 
track of objects seen in the initial view in all subsequent 
views. If some could be found, one could triangulate one’s 
position in the map and thus localising oneself. However, at 
some limiting points, one will not be able to do so and this 
is when one needs to expand the map to include a new view 
(albeit, a new local environment). If the new view to be 
added is selected at a point just before reaching a limiting 
point, it could be added to the map using the same method 
of triangulation. From a human perceptual mapping 
standpoint, this solution is attractive since humans have 
developed powerful mechanisms for recognising objects. 
Two points regarding the application of this method are 
worth noting here. First, for this method to work, it is 
important that one is able to track objects across successive 
views and for human vision, the fact that there is significant 
overlap between views ensures that this could be done. 
Second, the accuracy of this method depends on how 
accurately one can identify the position of the tracked 
objects in the map (or more precisely, the position of those 
points needed for triangulation). For humans, it is unlikely 
that the position of these points is always identified 
accurately and thus the map produced will be rough and 
vary among different individuals. The latter is a point 
emphasized in Ishikawa and Montello’s (2006) study 
mentioned earlier. 
A general algorithm for implementing this new theory can 
now be specified. Let PM be the perceptual map, V0 be 
one’s initial view, and R be some reference objects 
identified in V0. Initialise PM with V0. For each move 
through the environment, do: 
 
Move and update: 
1. Execute move instruction and get new view, Vn. 
2. Search for the reference objects in Vn and remove from 
R those that are not found.  
3. If R still contains a sufficient number of reference 
objects, go to step 1. 
4. Expand PM, create a new R and go to step 1  
 
In summary, the theory specifies that what is made 
explicit in a perceptual map is an integrated global 
representation of views selected during a journey. This is 
because each of these views provides an adequate 
description of the spatial layout of the local environment 
experienced. The basic algorithm for implementing the 
theory involves recognising objects in the current view that 
were remembered in the perceptual map, and using them to 
triangulate position of unknown objects (including the self) 
in the map. Compared to the traditional approach, this 
approach offers a simpler and less computationally 
expensive method for computing a perceptual map.  
On Implementation and Results 
Does the theory work? Can it produce a reasonably 
accurate perceptual map? One way to test the theory is to 
implement it and as Marr (1982) argued, the significance of 
a computational theory is that its implementation can be 
done independently. Hence, the theory was tested on a 
different platform – a mobile robot equipped with a laser 
sensor1. The details of our implementations will be reported 
elsewhere. This section highlights some key aspects of the 
implementation and the lessons learned so that in the next 
section, the significance of the theory is discussed with a 
concrete example. 
To begin with, the theory leaves open two key 
implementation issues, namely how and what objects are 
selected for tracking across views, and how and when a new 
view is added to the perceptual map. These issues would 
depend on the kind of perceptual apparatus one has and 
one’s needs in dealing with the environment. For our robot, 
the following is implemented. Laser points in each view are 
turned into lines denoting surfaces perceived. Any 
reasonably sized surfaces with at least an occluding edge are 
                                                           
1In reality, the reverse is true. The perceptual mapping problem 
was first investigated by considering how a robot, although with a 
different sensor, could solve a similar perceptual mapping 
problem. I refer to such robots as “albots” (Yeap, 2011). 
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tracked across views. The latter condition is imposed to 
ensure a good reference point exists for calculating the 
relative position of other surfaces in the map.  Using laser, 
one’s ability to perform recognition is limited. Thus, to 
track these surfaces between views, we use the traditional 
transformation method to locate them. To decide when to 
add a new view, the robot first detects if it has exited the 
local environment (by detecting that its current view has 
less than two tracked surfaces). Then it adds its previous 
view to the map (since with less than two tracked surfaces 
in the current view, it cannot add the current view to the 
map). When adding a new view, no attempt is made to 
update overlapping surfaces between the two views. All 
information in the perceptual map that occupies the same 
area covered by the current view will be deleted and 
replaced by what is in the view. The rationale here is that 
details are unimportant as long the overall shape of the 






Figure 3. The perceptual map produced.  
 
The robot algorithm used in this implementation is:   
1. Execute move instruction and get a new view, Vn. 
2. If it is a turn instruction, use Vn to expand PM and 
create a new R. Go to step 1. 
3. Search for the reference objects in Vn by 
transforming previous view to the new view using the 
mathematical transformation approach.  
4. If less than two objects are found, use Vn-1 to expand 
PM and Vn to create a new R. To expand PM, one 
replaces what is in front of the robot in PM with what 
is seen in Vn-1. Go to step 1. 
5. Remove reference objects in R that are no longer in 
view. Go to step 1. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the perceptual map produced as the robot 
traversed the path through the environment in Figure 2. The 
dotted line indicates the approximate path of the robot. 
Points A (start) and B (end) should be the same points. 
Unlike the map as shown in Figure 1, this map preserves the 
overall shape of the environment visited. Figure 4 (left 
column) shows four consecutive steps of the robot. The 
right column shows the map expanded only ay the fourth 
step. The circle marks what information is missing in the 
map. Note that the position of the robot in the map (the little 
arrows) is estimated and it does not correspond to the exact 
position of the robot in the physical environment. 
Figure 4. A trace of the mapping process 
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Discussion 
The perceptual map shown in Figure 3 is imprecise and 
incomplete in the sense that it is not accurate in metric terms 
and has perceived surfaces missing. Yet, the overall shape 
of the environment experienced is maintained (as compared 
with the map in Figure 1). The theory thus works, at least on 
a mobile robot.  
The present implementation, using a mobile robot with a 
perceptual system different from that of humans, shows that 
one can select different kinds of information as a reference 
object. This demonstrates the generality of this new 
approach. For humans, one expects a more complex method 
to select the reference objects in view. For the robot using a 
laser sensor, it is limited to selecting 2D line surfaces. 
Although the map computed by the robot is incomplete and 
imprecise, it is complete and precise in the sense that the 
overall shape of the environment is well preserved. This is 
partly due to the choice of information used as reference 
objects and partly due to the fact that the test environment is 
indoors. Both conditions enable the robot to detect several 
reference objects appearing directly in front of, and not far 
from, the robot. Consequently, the perceptual map is 
expanded more frequently, producing a more complete map. 
Furthermore, occluding edges of the reference targets 
provide good reference points for relative positioning of 
new information and the laser sensor provides accurate 
distance measurement of these points and especially if they 
are not too far away. Both conditions enable a fairly 
accurate map to be computed. From a robotics perspective, 
the map computed is considered surprisingly accurate since 
no error correction was done at the sensing level.  
The perceptual map thus varies in details, both in terms of 
precision and completeness due to how often the map is 
expanded and the accuracy of the information used for 
expanding the map. This variability can explain the 
individual differences of human perceptual maps (Ishikawa 
and Montello, 2006). In an outdoor environment, it is likely 
that one selects reference objects consisting of large and 
easily visible distant objects. If so, one’s perceptual map 
might not be expanded that often and consequently, one can 
experience not remembering much even through one has 
walked through a locally complex environment. In such 
cases, what is remembered can be the reference objects 
themselves. This might explain the emergence of landmarks 
in cognitive maps. The theory thus predicts some target 
features in one’s perceptual map will become landmarks in 
one’s cognitive map under the circumstances described.  
The use of reference objects to expand a perceptual map 
has support in the literature on human vision. It has been 
reported that nearly all animals with good vision fixate on 
an object as they move, followed by some fast saccades that 
shift the direction of gaze (Carpenter, 1988; Land, 1999). 
These studies focused on why we have saccades but for the 
present study, it is the fixation of the eyes on an object that 
is more revealing.  Such a mechanism allows humans (and 
animals) to locate and fixate on a reference object as they 
move and then uses saccades to improve the quality of the 
information perceived. One fixates using the high visual 
acuity region, which provides detailed reference object 
information. This aids later recognition and working out the 
position of other objects in the perceptual map. 
Glennerster et al. (2009) provide an alternative 
explanation for the above observation to support their idea 
that humans do not continuously integrate successive views 
into a precise integrated 3D model. The reason for the latter 
is to explain an interesting finding from their experiments 
showing humans failure to notice the expansion of a room 
around them in an immersive virtual environment. To 
account for their findings, they proposed that humans 
compute a view graph of their environment rather than a 
precise 3D model.  Each node in the graph is a stored 
snapshot of a scene and the link between them records the 
motor output required to move between nodes. The view 
graph idea is also popular for modeling animal spatial 
behavior and for robots (e.g Scholkopf & Mallot, 1995). 
However, they noted the view graph idea does not explain 
how different views are combined to form a consistent 
representation, i.e. a perceptual map. They claimed that this 
is an important and unsolved challenge. Interestingly, the 
theory proposed here could be considered as view-based 
since each local environment entered into the perceptual 
map is an individual view of the environment. However, 
each view is not captured as a node in a graph and there is 
no encoding of instructions to move from one node to the 
other. This theory provides a possible mechanism for 
integrating views to build a global map. 
That the perceptual map is not updated from each 
successive view is strongly supported by the change 
blindness phenomenon. However, there is often a claim 
among these researchers that change blindness argues for a 
rethinking of how vision works and that no global map is 
computed. As O’Regan (1992) puts it succinctly: “the 
outside world is considered as a kind of external memory 
store which can be accessed instantaneously by casting 
one’s eyes to some location.” This theory provides an 
alternative way in which a global map can be computed 
without updating from each successive view and it is 
evidently clear that such a map is much needed in our 
interaction with the environment (Glennerster et al., 2009). 
The fact that the map is not constantly updated could also 
explain why our perception of the world is a stable one. If 
one were to use the transformation method, then the 
locations of all the points in the map are constantly adjusted 
to accommodate what is in the current view. If one were to 
trace the map computed at each step, one could see the 
shape of the map changes constantly as it adjusts the errors 
in the map. This is not the case here. The local environment 
once perceived in a given view will not change until much 
later. This gives the impression of having a very stable map 
(see Figure 4). 
Conclusion 
A computational theory of human perceptual mapping is 
presented which shows how a perceptual map is computed 
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without integrating successive views. The theory is 
supported by various accounts of how humans perceive their 
world and in particular our lack of attention to changes and 
the illusory nature of our perception. The theory has 
provided tentative account of various observations about 
human spatial cognition and in particular how a stable world 
is perceived and how landmarks might emerge. The 
implementation of the theory shows how the map computed 
is both imprecise and incomplete and yet still preserves a 
good shape of the environment. The implementation also 
shows how the theory could be implemented differently to 
produce map with different precisions and details and this 
was offered as an explanation as to why individual 
differences are observed.  
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